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PART 2

The IFC’s New Africa,
Latin America, and
Caribbean Fund:
Its Worrisome Start,
and How to Fix It
Patrick J. Keenan — Professor of Law, University of Illinois
Christiana Ochoa — Professor of Law, Indiana University - Bloomington

Abstract

a disappointment. It has invested only in large corpora-

In April 2010 the International Finance Corporation an-

tions that were already well known to investors. The fund

nounced the creation of the African, Latin American, and

should return to the principles that seemed to motivate its

Caribbean fund, a new co-investment vehicle funded largely

creation: direct engagement with private enterprises, rather

with commitments from sovereign wealth and pension funds.

than politically-connected financial intermediaries; leverag-

The fund’s objective was to draw on the IFC and the World

ing the World Bank’s superior knowledge and understand-

Bank’s strengths in emerging markets to identify and sup-

ing of emerging markets, rather than investing in corpora-

port enterprises that might not otherwise have come to the

tions listed in London or Frankfurt; and providing capital to

attention of large investors and thereby help strengthen the

small- and medium-sized enterprises that would otherwise

private sector and alleviate poverty in some of the world’s

not have the support needed to grow and compete nation-

poorest countries. Unfortunately the fund has, so far, proven

ally or globally.
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On April 12, 2010, the International Finance Corporation (IFC) announced

citizens rather than to provide support to the ruling regime or to a small

the creation of a new fund that will make equity investments in compa-

handful of elites. Put slightly differently, wealth transfers are unlikely to be

nies in the developing world [Zoellick (2008)]. The new fund, called the

effective tools of development unless someone – investors, citizens, regu-

Africa, Latin America, and Caribbean fund (or ALAC) is a vehicle through

lators – has the capacity to hold accountable managers of that wealth if

which sovereign wealth funds and pension funds can co-invest with the

they steal, abuse, or misuse it. This accountability could come from an

IFC in equity investments in emerging markets [IFC (2010a)]. The ALAC

informed citizenry that votes out politicians who misuse the country’s

fund represents the fulfillment of World Bank president Robert Zoellick’s

resources or from investors who punish poor stewards of wealth. These

call for sovereign wealth funds to direct one percent of their investments

mechanisms are not novel, but they are also not particularly relevant in

to private enterprises in Africa [IFC (2010a)]. Zoellick argued that invest-

many of the places where development has lagged. For example, it is sim-

ments by sovereign funds, if done in partnership with the IFC, could help

ply not realistic to assume that the citizens of Nigeria will have the informa-

to transform the economies of many poor countries. The ALAC fund was

tion and governance tools necessary to punish their leaders, who have

not a complete fulfillment of Zoellick’s vision: he called for investments

squandered billions of dollars of that country’s oil riches. Or for investors in

of approximately U.S.$1 billion in Africa alone; at its inception the ALAC

corporations whose supply chains begin – often without the end-user’s full

fund had commitments of approximately U.S.$600 million, to be used in

knowledge – in the squalid mines of the Democratic Republic of Congo.

Africa, Latin America, and the Caribbean. The ALAC fund is managed
by the IFC and is a co-investment fund, meaning that it only invests in

To address these real-world problems, it is important to incorporate safe-

projects in which the IFC is also investing [IFC (2010a)]. Consequently,

guards that might not be necessary in other investment contexts. Three

despite being smaller and less focused that Zoellick might have hoped,

principles are most important for such a fund. First, the fund should avoid, to

the ALAC fund is a significant new player in the emerging market equity

the extent possible, channeling funds through governments, either directly

game, and for this reason alone warrants some attention as it begins its

or indirectly. The reason for this is to reduce opportunities for politicians to

work. It has the potential to substantially influence the nascent but im-

abuse wealth transfers for political purposes or private enrichment. Sec-

portant emerging market private equity industry for good or ill, depending

ond, the fund should facilitate direct engagement between managers and

on the kinds of investments it makes and the conditions associated with

the targets of investments. The goal of this is to help transfer knowledge

those investments. In this article, we attempt to accomplish three objec-

as wealth is transferred and to provide more direct oversight in the target

tives. The first is to analyze the potential for the ALAC fund to accomplish

enterprises. In practical terms, this would mean avoiding investments in in-

the IFC’s stated goals, particularly in light of the markets in which the

termediaries. Third, the fund should aim low: invest in small- and mid-sized

fund will make its investments. Second, we review the ALAC fund’s initial

enterprises. Such a strategy is inevitably less efficient than targeting large,

investments and show that, despite the best intentions, the fund appears

well-established enterprises, but the IFC’s reason for existing, and its role

not to have learned from past mistakes, making it likely to repeat them.

as co-investor, is to handle such inefficiencies.

Finally, we conclude by proposing several reforms that, taken together,
would increase the likelihood that the ALAC fund’s investments would

One strand of the “transfer wealth, improve welfare” approach centers on

improve the welfare of the people in countries in which it invests.

official development assistance. For some of the world’s most influential
economists, this means that the governments of relatively wealthy coun-

Do infusions of wealth improve welfare?

tries should transfer more money to the governments of relatively impecu-

It is an article of faith among most – but certainly not all – economic de-

nious countries. Economist Jeffrey Sachs of Columbia University is per-

velopment professionals that poor countries need more wealth transfers

haps the most prominent purveyor of this approach through his advocacy

to achieve economic development. Different strands of this dominant ap-

of the Millennium Development Goals. The MDGs were developed by the

proach to development focus on transfers in the form of official devel-

United Nations as a set of benchmarks, the achievement of which would

opment assistance, foreign direct investment, or the sale of exploitable

indicate a significant reduction in poverty and improvement in welfare.

natural resources. What unites them is the faith that transferring wealth

For Sachs and others, the principal impediment to the achievement of the

will improve welfare. The problem with this theory is that the evidence

MDGs is “the donor shortfall in honoring specific financial commitments to

simply does not support it. To be sure, wealth transfers can improve wel-

Africa” and other countries [Sachs (2010)].The problem, in other words, is

fare. But it is not inevitable that wealth transfers will improve welfare.

that rich-country governments are not transferring enough money to poor-

What matters more than the kind of transfer are the conditions associ-

country governments: were these transfers to occur, then poor countries

ated with those transfers.

would be able to pull themselves out of poverty. Even among economists
who disagree almost as a matter of course, there is agreement that devel-
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For wealth transfers to be effective, they must generate the incentives nec-

opment assistance has not produced the hoped-for results. For example,

essary to ensure that the recipients of that wealth use it to benefit ordinary

William Easterly, a prominent skeptic of development assistance, at least
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as it has typically been delivered, has argued that there have been virtually

on the wealth of developing countries [Evans (1971)]. Contrary to the typi-

no positive effects from aid [Easterly et al. (2004)]. On this point Easterly

cal assumptions, there is ample empirical evidence demonstrating that FDI

agrees with David Dollar, who is much less skeptical of foreign assistance

often slows growth [Kosack and Tobin (2006)]. This is particularly true in

in general, but who also notes that aid has had very little positive effect in

poor countries. Interestingly, resource-rich countries may perform even

recipient countries [Burnside and Dollar (2000)]. In addition, development

worse with FDI as private investment can deprive them of monetary gains

assistance has not just been less effective than intended. Just as with re-

while, at the same time, diminishing their long-term potential (in the form of

source revenue, aid also appears to contribute to a reduction in welfare and

retained natural resources) for economic development [Ochoa (2008)].

an erosion of governance [Knack (2001)]. For example, foreign aid appears
to contribute to an increase in official corruption as politicians compete for

To evaluate the new ALAC fund it is not sufficient to show that infusions

the control of the wealth [Alesina and Weder (2002)]. Aid dependence can

of wealth can reduce welfare. It is also important to identify some of

also undermine the quality of a country’s institutions of governance and

the reasons why this is true. One explanation is that when individuals

erode democracy [Djankov et al. (2008)]. To be sure, there are examples of

perceive that there is one and only one way to become wealthy, they

development projects that have worked. Nonetheless, over the long term,

follow it to the exclusion of other options. Put another way, rent-seek-

foreign aid has not contributed to growth [Clemens et al. (2004)].

ing amounts to “[c]utting yourself a bigger slice of the cake rather than
making the cake bigger.” [Bishop (2004)]. When politicians in power can

A second strand of the “transfer wealth, improve welfare” school centers

depend on revenue from the sale of a natural resource to fund their re-

on the potential for resource wealth to transform the economies of poor

gime and the institutions of government, they are relieved of the need

countries. Countries whose economies are heavily dependent on revenue

to make the politically difficult choices that might support broad-based

from the sale of natural resources have not fared as well as countries with-

economic development. For example, when a regime can fund itself by

out such resource wealth. Research on the resource curse, as it is often

selling natural resources, “the state has less need for taxation of the

labeled, has shown that many countries that are heavily dependent on rev-

population, and without the pressure for taxation the state has less need

enue from a single resource have weaker economies, other things equal,

to develop mechanisms of deep control of the citizenry.” [Isham et al.

than similarly-situated countries that do not possess the valuable resource

(2005)]. In addition, a regime can use unconditioned wealth to support

[Keenan and Ochoa (2009)]. The first, and still leading, article on this issue

politically useful but economically unsound investments [Kolstad et al.

came from Jeffrey D. Sachs and Andrew M. Warner, who analyzed the

(2009)]. In Nigeria, for example, to placate its supporters, the government

role of natural resource wealth in development [Sachs and Warner (1995)].

has invested heavily in manufacturing. Unfortunately, because the true

Sachs and Warner used a database of 97 resource-rich countries and com-

objective of the government’s investments was political, not economic,

pared each country’s growth rate to its level of resource dependence. Even

those investments have contributed little to economic growth. According

after controlling for a number of other variables, Sachs and Warner found

to one recent empirical study of Nigeria, “two-thirds of the investment in

“a statistically significant, inverse, and robust association between natural

manufacturing by the government is consistently wasted.” [Sala-i-Martin

resource intensity and growth.” [Sachs and Warner (1995)]. Although it is

and Subramanian (2003)]. When politicians manage assets with only po-

typically referred to as the “resource curse” [Auty (1993)], the phenomenon

litical objectives in mind, they can make bad investment decisions. In

was initially called the “Dutch disease” [Economist (1977)], a term used

perhaps the most complete account of this phenomenon, Michael Ross

to describe the effects on an economy resulting from the sale of natu-

has shown that politicians in Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines

ral resources [Collier (2007)]. Recent research has shown that resource-

were motivated by the rents available from timber sales and undermined

dependent economies face a number of other ills: a possible increase in

national and local institutions in order to exploit the timber [Ross (2001)].

official corruption [Tornell and Lane (1999)], a greater likelihood of conflict

Similarly, a recent report has demonstrated this phenomenon among

[Aslaksen and Torvik (2006)], a misallocation of resources [Robinson and

Cambodia’s ruling elite [Global Witness (2009)].

Torvik (2005)], longer tenure for leaders of the ruling regime [Smith (2004)],
and reductions in various measures of social welfare.

The ALAC fund’s wobbly first steps
The ALAC fund was born of the World Bank’s best intentions and is the

A final strand of the “transfer wealth, improve welfare” school holds that

kind of investment vehicle that could, under the right circumstances, help

it is private investment, not official development assistance, that is most

to improve the lives of some of the poorest people in the world. When

likely to help the poorest countries grow. Investment by foreign corpora-

the fund was created, World Bank’s Robert Zoellick described it as an at-

tions in poor countries is, of course, not new. What is new is the argument

tempt to harness the “significant savings pool” represented by “pension

that private-sector investment is a surer path to economic development

and sovereign funds” seeking “commercial returns and portfolio diversi-

than official development assistance or the sale of natural resources. Re-

fication.” [IFC (2010a)]. The fund is managed by the IFC’s Asset Manage-

searchers have long known that foreign investment can act as a net drain

ment Company, LLC, a wholly-owned subsidiary of the IFC. Because the
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IFC has been slow to release detailed information about the ALAC fund,

then the IFC should have left these investments to the market. This is

it is difficult to pinpoint the fund’s strategy. When the fund was created,

particularly true of Guaranty Trust Bank, the Nigerian bank that was the

the CEO of the IFC described it as part of the IFC’s overall strategy of

recipient of the fund’s third investment. Guaranty Trust Bank is listed on

providing “co-investment opportunities to sovereign and pension fund

the London Stock Exchange (and the Nigerian Stock Exchange), which

investors.” [IFC (2010a)]. Investors in the fund indicated that they had

should provide it with access to necessary capital. This is not to suggest

two objectives beyond earning a return and diversifying their portfolios:

that the fund should never invest in a listed enterprise, but such an in-

greater access to “frontier markets” and “sustainable investment oppor-

vestment clearly does not fulfill the IFC’s stated goal of using its superior

tunities.” [IFC (2010a)].

knowledge of emerging markets to identify investment opportunities that
other investors would fail to recognize.

To date the ALAC fund has announced four investments, three in Africa
and one in the Caribbean. It is, of course, difficult to draw any firm con-

The fund’s investment in HeidelbergCement is perhaps even more puz-

clusions about the fund’s strategy based on a small number of invest-

zling. HeidelbergCement is the fourth-largest cement company in the

ments made over the course of one year. But the initial decisions are not

world [HeidelbergCement (2010)]. It does business worldwide and is list-

encouraging. Unfortunately the ALAC’s funds initial investments are not

ed on the German stock exchanges. It hardly seems the kind of company

consistent with the principles that would make it a viable tool for accom-

that the IFC is uniquely positioned to recognize as a valuable investment

plishing its dual goals: facilitating development and poverty reduction,

target, or the kind of company that needs funds from an international

and providing a return to investors. Three of the fund’s first four invest-

financial institution to signal to the markets that it is a viable enterprise

ments have been in financial institutions – intermediaries that are one

poised for growth. If the ALAC fund was actually seeking to support en-

step removed from the entrepreneurs whose work can actually fuel eco-

terprises with the potential to deliver a return and deliver on the IFC’s

nomic growth. The fourth investment is in a German cement company

development mission as well, then the fund chose the wrong targets.

whose work is largely in infrastructure.
A second problem is that three of the four recipients of investment are fiThree of the ALAC fund’s first four investments have been in financial

nancial intermediaries. If the ALAC fund is to be different and more effec-

services companies. So far the fund has invested in Ecobank Transna-

tive than any other private equity investor, then it should focus on small

tional, a bank with operations throughout Africa, Guaranty Trust Bank,

and medium-sized enterprises. Most international financial institutions

a Nigerian bank, and Guardian Holdings, a Caribbean insurance com-

find it difficult to oversee the quantity of SME investments that would be

pany. The fourth investment is in HeidelbergCement, a German group

necessary to have a meaningful impact on development and provide a

with substantial operations in West Africa. None of these investments is

market return to investors. This concern is real, but the IFC is – or ought

the kind that is likely to promote ground-level development, avoid the risk

to be – different. Its mission is to help alleviate poverty by promoting pri-

of corruption or politicized decision making, and transfer knowledge and

vate sector development. There is surely something to the conventional

expertise to entrepreneurs.

wisdom that support for regional banks can have a multiplier effect by
helping to solidify private equity markets in new areas and signaling inter-

One problem is the size of the fund’s investment targets. At first blush

national confidence in markets thought to be unstable. But the IFC’s goal

there is little reason to be skeptical of investments in these four enter-

in creating the ALAC fund was to provide these benefits by taking equity

prises. All are well-established players in their respective industries and

stakes in enterprises that were not otherwise known to most investors;

known to the IFC and other international financial institutions. But it is

something it has so far failed to do.

these very qualities that give us pause. The ALAC fund’s investment
strategy has been only hazily disclosed, but there are two likely strate-

A third problem with the fund’s initial investments is that it has chosen

gies. Either the fund is seeking conventional investments that are attrac-

companies that are sufficiently large to be politically important, and that

tive to the fund for the same reasons they would be attractive to any other

operate in markets that are sufficiently risky to make them need govern-

investor, or it is seeking unconventional opportunities that it has reason to

ment favor to thrive. Indeed, two of the reasons the IFC gave for choosing

believe can deliver a return with sufficient knowledge transfer, oversight,

to invest in Guaranty Trust Bank in Nigeria are telling: one was to signal

or support. Thus, if the ALAC fund chose its initial investments because

its “confidence in Nigerian banking reforms,” and another was to show

they are strong players, well positioned to provide a solid market return

support for the “Central Bank’s initiatives to strengthen the overall bank-

on investment, then the fund simply put its money where many other

ing sector.” [IFC (2010b)]. Ecobank, another early recipient of the fund’s

investors would have been willing to put their money.

investment, was accused of complicity in the bloody wars in West Africa
as the bank that received payments for illicit timber sales that fueled the
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If the IFC chose its initial targets because they are attractive to the market,

war for years [Carvajal (2010), Global Witness (2009)]. Ecobank thrived
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because it was connected to those with power, and it has a recent and

large, well-established enterprises that are not likely to transform local

well-publicized history as banker to warlords. Nonetheless the IFC chose

economies or improve the lives of local people.

it as one of its initial investment targets.
Based on its track record so far the ALAC fund must be considered a

Conclusion: creating a fund that could make a
difference

missed opportunity. But if the fund refocused its strategy to work di-

Putting the ALAC fund on the right path would take courage, but has the

search for and find investment targets not known to other investors, then

potential to do enormous good. The fund should return to the principles

it might fulfill its potential.

rectly with smaller, less politically dependent enterprises, and it began to

that seemed to animate Robert Zoellick’s initial vision for such a fund: direct engagement with private enterprises, leveraging the World Bank’s superior knowledge and understanding of emerging markets, and providing
capital to small- and medium-sized enterprises that would otherwise not
have the support needed to grow and compete nationally or globally.
The IFC exists to work with private enterprises, and does so all the time.
But its approach to engagement with private enterprises appears to be
indifferent to what those enterprises do. One typical argument for development assistance and investment by international financial institutions is that these investments can improve the capacity of host-country
institutions and improve the rule of law. Our approach is different. We
argue for direct engagement with private enterprises as a way to enable those enterprises to strengthen local institutions. Recent history is
rife with examples of development assistance and foreign investment in
large, politically-connected firms that resulted in an erosion of local institutions, not an improvement. Our approach would give local enterprises
the wherewithal to compete in the marketplace, and thereby enhance
the vitality of local communities and create a base for reform of local
institutions. The ALAC fund’s initial investments are all in large, well-established, politically-connected enterprises with little or no incentive to
push for meaningful institutional reform.
When it created the ALAC fund, the World Bank and the IFC indicated
that the fund would be a vehicle through which investors could earn a
return by relying on the World Bank’s superior knowledge of emerging
markets and its ability to work directly in some of the most challenging
environments in the world. Such a fund would indeed have the potential
to generate a market return and fulfill the World Bank’s poverty-alleviation
mission. Unfortunately, that is not what the ALAC fund has done, at least
so far. Based on its initial investments, there is nothing to indicate that
the World Bank or the IFC have leveraged any special knowledge, experience, or understanding to identify investment opportunities that would
not have been apparent to other investors.
The ALAC fund provided the IFC with an opportunity to strengthen its
move toward working with small- and medium-sized enterprises. It is
these enterprises that have the best potential to transform emerging
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